Abstract-Cloud-assisted IoT applications are gaining an expanding interest, such that IoT devices are deployed in different distributed environments to collect and outsource sensed data to remote servers for further processing and sharing among users. On the one hand, in several applications, collected data are extremely sensitive and need to be protected before outsourcing. Generally, encryption techniques are applied at the data producer side to protect data from adversaries as well as curious cloud provider. On the other hand, sharing data among users requires fine grained access control mechanisms. To ensure both requirements, Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) has been widely applied to ensure encrypted access control to outsourced data. Although, ABE ensures fine grained access control and data confidentiality, updates of used access policies after encryption and outsourcing of data remains an open challenge. In this paper, we design PU-ABE, a new variant of key policy attribute based encryption supporting efficient access policy update that captures attributes addition to access policies. PU-ABE contributions are multifold. First, access policies involved in the encryption can be updated without requiring sharing secret keys between the cloud server and the data owners neither re-encrypting data. Second, PU-ABE ensures privacy preserving and fine grained access control to outsourced data. Third, ciphertexts received by the end-user are constant sized and independent from the number of attributes used in the access policy which affords low communication and storage costs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, IoT applications are widely used in different fields such as smart cities, e-health, intelligent transport systems, to name a few [1] - [3] . Due to their limited storage and computation capacities, IoT devices are usually assisted with cloud services to store and process generated data [4] , [5] IoT devices produce huge amounts of data which need to be securely collected and shared among different users [6] , [7] . Consequently, encryption and access control mechanisms are important to protect data from unauthorised access [8] , [9] .
Attribute based encryption (ABE) ensures encrypted access control to outsourced data while limiting privacy leakage of data producers and users [10] , [11] . ABE consists of enciphering data with respect to an access policy over a set of attributes where users who have the matching attributes can recover data. Nowadays, with the emergence of applications adapted to distributed and dynamic environments, several settings require adding new users, strengthening access patterns and/or removing current users from systems. A naive solution is to reencrypt the whole data contents using new access policy by the data owner and re-outsource them to the cloud server. However, this solution is extremely expensive in computation and communications costs as it should be re-executed at every time a user is added or removed. Proxy re-encryption techniques are used to update users in outsourced systems. These mechanisms allow a server to re-encrypt stored data without accessing their content using a re-encryption key [12] , [13] . Attribute-based Proxy Re-encryption (AB-PRE) systems have been applied for access policy update. In AB-PRE, when the data owner decides to update access policies of some ciphertexts, she uses her private key to generated a re-encryption key for each ciphertext to be changed from an old access policy to a new one. Afterwards, all the generated re-encryption keys are uploaded to a proxy server to update the ciphertext using the received keys. Although AB-PRE schemes allow re-encryption without decrypting ciphertext or accessing the plaintexts, it requires that the data owner generates valid re-encryption keys. When the number of ciphertext rises, it becomes inefficient for a data owner to generate all the re-encryption keys and upload them to the proxy. Furthermore, this may also be unfeasible for limited bandwidths. Therefore, attribute-based proxy reencryption schemes may not be efficient when updating a huge the number of ciphertexts.
Key Policy Attribute Based Encryption (KP-ABE) is widely applied to secure data in several distributed systems such as Publish and Subscribe systems (Pub/Sub) [14] , [15] , pay-TV systems [16] , vehicular networks [17] , ..., where rules on who may read a document must be specified but it is unable to specify policies on a per-message basis. Obviously, these dynamic environments usually require efficiently adding new users and/or revoking existent users. That is, KP-ABE consists in labeling user's key by an access structure that specifies which type of ciphertext the key can decrypt, while ciphertext are labeled by a set of attributes. Thus, KP-ABE are adapted to distributed and decentralized environments. Instead, Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based Encryption (CP-ABE) schemes consists in associating an access structure to the ciphertext while assigning a set of credentials to deciphering users. CP-ABE schemes supporting policy update have been 924 recently explored by Jiang et al. [18] , [19] . Indeed, the authors proposed a CP-ABE scheme where new attributes can be added or current attributes can be removed efficiently without sharing re-encryption keys.
This motivates us to introduce the first KP-ABE scheme supporting adding and/or removing attributes from the access policy without sharing keys with the cloud server.
Contributions -
In this paper, we propose Policy Update Attribute Based Encryption (PU-ABE), a novel key policy attribute based encryption scheme which supports access policy update. This proposed scheme is suitable for bandwidth-limited applications as the size of the ciphertext received by end-users does not depend on the number of attributes involved in the access policy. In PU-ABE, the encrypting entity generates a ciphertext involving encrypted data together with some extra components used for supporting the access policy update feature. The ciphertext is forwarded to the cloud server that can update the access policy upon demand. Indeed, the cloud server does not need to be trusted. That is, it stores and shares ciphertexts among authorised users and also executes access policy update algorithm as requested. While executing these functionalities, the remote server is unable of decrypting any ciphertexts neither accessing any secret keys. For supporting the policy update feature, PU-ABE provides a function that permits to add new attributes to the access policy used to encrypt data.
Paper Organisation -The remainder of this work is as follows: Section II introduces PU-ABE framework and highlights security considerations and design goals. In Section IV, an overview of PU-ABE is introduced and the detailed construction is presented, before concluding in Section V.
II. PU-ABE FRAMEWORK
In this section, we first present the network model, detailing the involved entities and their interactions in Section II-A. Then, we detail the security requirements that the proposed system should fulfill in Section II-B.
A. Architecture
Our PU-ABE framework considers a cloud service provider that stores data generated by data owners and share them among authorised users. Four different entities are defined as follows:
• The Central Trusted Authority (CTA), known by the Attribute authority, is responsible for generating the global public parameters and issuing users' secret keys. CTA is considered as a trusted entity in our model. • The Cloud Service Provider (CSP) is a remote cloud server who stores and shares data among authorised users. CSP is also responsible of executing the update algorithm to change the access policy involved in the ciphertext, w.r.t. the data owner's recommendations.
• The data owner (O) is the data producer. She defines access rights and encrypts data with respect to them before outsourcing to the cloud. In addition, the data owner generates extra ciphertext components used by the update algorithm.
• The data user (U) requests access to outsourced data.
She decrypts the received data using his access rights. A user may be malicious if she tries to access data without authorisation.
B. Security Requirements
To design an efficient attribute based encryption scheme supporting efficient access policy update, the following requirements need to be achieved:
• access policy update -our PU-ABE scheme should ensure adding new attributes to the access policy.
• flexible access control -our proposal should ensure flexible security policies among dynamic groups of users, w.r.t. forward secrecy and backward secrecy.
-backward secrecy means that a new added user to a group is unable to decrypt information created prior to their introduction. -forward secrecy means that a compromise of the secret key does not affect the secrecy of future encrypted data.
• data confidentiality -our PU-ABE scheme has to protect the secrecy of outsourced and encrypted data contents against curious users and curious cloud service provider.
• low computation overhead and storage cost -the proposed algorithms should have low processing complexity and acceptable storage cost to be adapted to resourceconstrained devices and distributed environments.
III. MATHEMATICAL BACKGROUND
In this section, we first introduce the access structure in subsection III-A. Then, in subsection III-B, we present the bilinear maps.
A. Access Policies
Access policies can be represented as a boolean functions of attributes or a Linear Secret Sharing Scheme (LSSS) matrix.
Access Structure -
An access structure is a collection A of non-empty subsets of {P 1 , · · · , P n }, such as A ⊆ 2 {P1,··· ,Pn} \∅. Note that any access structure can be converted into a boolean function. Boolean functions can be defined as an access tree, where the leaves present the attributes while the intermediate and the root nodes are the logical operators AND (∧) and OR (∨).
Linear Secret Sharing Schemes (LSSS) -
Let P be a set of parties, A be l × n matrix, and ρ : {1, 2, · · · , l} → P be a function that maps a row to a party for labeling. A secret sharing scheme for access structure Ψ over a set of parties P is a linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS) in Z p and is represented by (A, ρ) if it consists of two efficient algorithms:
• Share ((A, ρ) • Recon((A, ρ) , S): The reconstruction algorithm takes as input an access set S ∈ A. Let I = {i|ρ(i) ∈ S}. It outputs a set of constants {μ i } i∈I such that i∈I μ i ·λ i = β 1 = s.
B. Bilinear Maps
Let G 1 , G 2 and G T be three multiplicative groups of a finite field having the same order p. An admissible asymmetric pairing functionê from G 1 × G 2 in G T has to be bilinear, non degenerate and efficiently computable.
IV. A NOVEL KEY POLICY ATTRIBUTE BASED ENCRYPTION SUPPORTING POLICY UPDATE
In this section, we first give an overview of our proposed constant size PU-ABE scheme (subsection IV-A). Then, we detail the scheme construction.
A. Overview
In this paper, we develop a novel key-policy attribute based encryption scheme that supports access policy update w.r.t. attributes' addition. Our contribution extends Wang et al.'s key policy attribute based encryption scheme [20] to support adding new attributes to the encryption access policy. Indeed, the cloud server is able to change a ciphertext encrypted with respect to an access policy S to a ciphertext encrypted with respect to a new access policy S such that S corresponds to S ∪ U for attributes' addition. This update does not need any re-encryption key neither the data owner to be online. It is only based on some extra ciphertext components as detailed in Section IV-B) which are used by the cloud server in the update algorithm. Indeed, while encrypting data contents, E generates additional elements in the ciphertext which point out attributes that can be added or removed later. When an access policy update is required, the cloud server uses the ciphertext's components to generate a new ciphertext suitable for the new access policy then forwards it to the decrypting entity.
B. Concrete Construction
Our PU-ABE construction, supporting attributes' addition, is based on five algorithms defined as follows:
• setup -given the security parameter ξ, the attribute authority chooses three cyclic groups G 1 , G 2 and G T of prime order p and defines a bilinear pairingê :
It also randomly selects two generators g ∈ G 1 and h ∈ G 2 as well as a secret random value α ∈ Z * p . In addition, the attribute authority sets v =ê(g, h), {h * ⇒ Z * p and outputs the public parameters pp as follows:
The master secret key is defined as msk = (g, α).
• encrypt -let S be the set of the encryption attributes
. The data owner chooses s ∈ Z * p and computes the ciphertext CT as follows:
• update -given a ciphertext CT encrypted w.r.t. a set of attributes S and U = {a 1 , · · · , a t } a new set of attributes where U ∩ S = ∅, the server has to add elements of U to the set of encrypting attributes S of the ciphertext CT .
To do so, it proceeds as follows:
Then, the algorithm computes
t. S , the new set of encrypting attributes defined as S = S ∪ U.
• keygen -it computes the private key associated to an access structure Ψ w.r.t. an LSSS scheme (A, ρ) such that A is the corresponding l × n matrix. First, the keygen algorithm generates shares of 1 relying on the LSSS schema w.r.t. (A, ρ) . Namely, it chooses a column vector β = (β 1 , β 2 , · · · , β n ) T , while β 1 = s = 1 and
T >, and sets sk as follows:
• decrypt -the cipherext CT is encrypted under the set of attributes S = S ∪ U = {a t+m i=1 }. The decrypting entity D having a secret key sk (A,ρ) first sets I = i|ρ(i) ∈ S , and calculates the reconstruction of constants μ i∈I = Recon((A, ρ) , S). The decryption key corresponding to the LSSS scheme w.r.t.
. Then, D computes the polynomial on the variable α with degree m + t − 1 as follows: 
Our PU-ABE scheme satisfies the correctness property. The correctness property requires that for all security parameter ξ, all attribute universe descriptions U, all (pp, msk) ∈ setup(ξ), all (S, U ) ⊆ U (i.e; U is the attribute universe), all sk ∈ keygen(pp, msk, Ψ), all M ∈ M (i.e; M is the message universe), all Ψ ∈ G (G is the access policy space), all CT ∈ encrypt(pp, S, M), and all CT ∈ (pp, CT, ind, U ) if the decrypting user has correctly obtained the secret key sk related to the Ψ required access policy S for deciphering the encrypted message, the derypt(pp, sk, CT ) outputs M .
V. CONCLUSIONS
Attribute based encryption is often used to ensure encrypted access control to outsourced data for multi-user settings. That is, in several applications, users are removed and/or added, thus, it require an efficient update of users' access rights.
In this paper, we propose PU-ABE, a novel key policy attribute based encryption technique, with short size ciphertexts that supports access policy update. Indeed, a cloud server can add attributes to the encryption access policy without requiring data re-encryption. Finally, PU-ABE ciphertexts are short-sized and independent from the number of attributes used in the access policy which affords low communication and storage costs, compared to most-closely related schemes.
As a future work, we aim to extend the proposed scheme to support attributes' revocation from the encryption policy without requiring data re-encryption neither sharing secret keys with the cloud service provider.
